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Abstract—High-resolution cameras produce huge
volume of high quality images everyday. It is extremely
challenging to store, share and especially search those
huge images, for which increasing number of cloud
services are presented to support such functionalities.
However, images tend to contain rich sensitive infor-
mation (e.g., people, location and event), and people’s
privacy concerns hinder their readily participation into
the services provided by untrusted third parties.
In this work, we introduce PIC: a Privacy-preserving
large-scale Image search system on Cloud. Our system
enables efficient yet secure content-based image search
with fine-grained access control, and it also provides
privacy-preserving image storage and sharing among
users. Users can specify who can/cannot search on their
images when using the system, and they can search
on others’ images if they satisfy the condition specified
by the image owners. Majority of the computationally
intensive jobs are outsourced to the cloud side, and
users only need to submit the query and receive the
result throughout the entire image search. Specially, to
deal with massive images, we design our system suitable
for distributed and parallel computation and introduce
several optimizations to further expedite the search
process.
We implement a prototype of PIC including both
cloud side and client side. The cloud side is a cluster of
computers with distributed file system (Hadoop HDFS)
and MapReduce architecture (Hadoop MapReduce).
The client side is built for both Windows OS laptops
and Android phones. We evaluate the prototype system
with large sets of real-life photos. Our security analysis
and evaluation results show that PIC successfully pro-
tect the image privacy at a low cost of computation and
communication.
I. Introduction
As on-board cameras get more and more popular,
numerous high-resolution photos are generated everyday,
which makes storing, sharing and especially searching
large-scale images become challenging issues. There are an
increasing number of service providers supporting cloud-
based image services, e.g., Amazon Cloud Drive, Apple
iCloud, Cloudinary, Flicker and Google. Content-based
image search is a core functionality for a variety of image
applications, such as personal image management, crim-
inal investigation using crowd-sourced photos (e.g., the
Boston Marathon investigation [1]) and medical image
study and diagnosis [2], [3]. It draws many attentions
from both industry (e.g., Google) and academics (e.g., [4],
[5]). However, there are a lot of private information in
images and the cloud could be untrustworthy [6], which
hinder the wide adoption of those useful image services.
While leveraging the power of cloud and crowdsourcing,
image services should be provided in a privacy-preserving
way. Besides, the image owner also requires the right to
determine who is valid to search and access his images.
(a) Compare original image and reconstructed
image using SIFT feature vector. [7]
(b) Feature vector detection and matching re-
sults between original image and reconstructed
image.
Fig. 1. Comparison between original image and images reconstructed
from feature vectors.
The state-of-the-art image search systems typically use
feature descriptors of images to measure their content
similarity, e.g., SIFT [8]. Feature descriptors are sets of
high-dimension feature vectors, e.g., 128-dimension for
SIFT [8], extracted from interest points of the images
(Fig. 1). Those feature descriptors are distinctive and show
good accuracy for image search. One image is usually
described by hundreds of feature vectors, then the mil-
lions of photos uploaded to the cloud imply that billions
of feature vectors need to be processed. Therefore, it
is necessary to introduce some optimization techniques
such as indexing or distributed computing to accelerate
the search process. Using feature vectors, many indexing
mechanisms are designed to facilitate large-scale image
search, e.g., [9], [5] and [10]. But most of them did not
support image privacy protection or assumed that the
feature vectors do not reveal useful information about
the original images. However, recent research shows that
an image can be approximately reconstructed based on
the output of a blackbox feature descriptor software such
as those classically used for image indexing [7], [11]. As
presented in Fig. 1, the image reconstructed using SIFT
feature vectors appears quite similar as the original image,
and shows a good matching result with the original one.
Even quantized binary feature vectors expose the content
of an image to some extent [12]. Those methods are entirely
automatic and much better reconstruction can be achieved
with user interaction, which arouse great concerns on the
image content privacy in the image indexing and search
systems.
Recently, some facts show that people pay more and
more attention to the privacy of their images, and the
increasing worry about privacy may be the key point in the
future cloud-based image services. For example, a smart-
phone app KeepSafe [13] hides images and videos from
unauthorized users by simply encrypting image folders
with a PIN code, and it owns 13 million users and gained
an investment of 2 millions dollars. Furthermore, the face
search functionality of Facebook has been abandoned for
two years due to the privacy concern from users and
governments [14].
As a result, massive image need efficient yet private
content-based search functions urgently. Existing large-
scale image indexing and search systems usually ignore
the privacy issue and do not support privacy protection
mechanisms. Some systems tag images with keywords
and metadata, and search on encrypted keywords, e.g.,
[15]–[18]. But keyword-based search methods cannot be
adopted for content-based image search, because they only
search the occurrences of encoded tags in an exact match
manner and cannot measure the distance between high-
dimension feature vectors. Moreover, they usually reveal
the search results to the cloud. To achieve content-based
image search, we need to measure the distance between
pairs of feature vectors as well as to protect the vectors and
search results. This problem is especially challenging when
we require no interaction with the image owner during the
whole search process and the image data are extremely
large (e.g., with millions of feature vectors). Traditional
secure multi-party computation (SMC) [19], [20], verifiable
computation [21] or simple homomorphic encryption [22],
[23] support privacy-preserving vector distance computa-
tion. But they cannot be the solution to the large-scale
image search problem. On one hand, the garbled circuit’s
size is exponentially greater than the size of the input,
and the input size in an image search is often very large
(e.g., thousands of 128-dimensional feature vectors of real
values), so the communication and computation overhead
is beyond practicality. On the other hand, a simple ho-
momorphic method will allow the decrypter of the final
result to also decrypt the individual ciphertexts. Moreover,
it requires rounds of interactions between the querier, data
owner and cloud server, which means the image owners
need to always stay online to react to image queries, which
is not practical either. Facing these challenges, we employ
the multi-level homomorphic encryption (Xiao et al [24])
as a building block to design an efficient non-interactive
image search system.
The main contributions of this paper can be summa-
rized as follows:
1) We propose a novel system (PIC) and techniques to
enable private content-based image search upon large-
scale encrypted images with untrusted servers. Our
system outsources the majority of the search job to the
cloud side, but neither the query result nor the query
itself is revealed to the cloud. What’s more, during
the search, no interaction is required between the data
owner and the querier or the cloud.
2) We design our private search compatible with the
standard image search to guarantee the search ac-
curacy. We also make it suitable for distributed and
parallel computation to enable efficient large-scale
image search. Several optimizations are introduced to
further expedite the search process.
3) We implemented a prototype including both cloud
side and client side. The cloud is a cluster of com-
puters with distributed file system (Hadoop HDFS)
and MapReduce architecture (Hadoop MapReduce).
We evaluate our system using large sets of highly di-
verse real-life photos. The security analysis shows that
PIC successfully protect the image privacy, and the
evaluation shows the efficiency of our system, which
is capable to be used in a wide range of platforms
including resource-bounded ones.
Roadmap.The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II reviews the image search model and Section III
introduces the building blocks of PIC. Section IV gives an
overview of our system framework. Section V presents the
details of our basic design, then we discuss the bottleneck
of system performance and refine system design in Section
VI. We show the security of PIC in Section VII. To evalu-
ate the practicality, we present comprehensive experiments
in Section VIII. Section IX discusses the related work, and
Section X concludes this paper.
II. Background on Large-scale Image Search
We address the problem of efficient large-scale image
search with untrusted cloud servers. Different from existing
work focusing on the search efficiency, we also consider the
image privacy (the image itself and its feature descriptors)
of the image owner and the query privacy (the query image
content and the query result) of the querier. To guarantee
the search accuracy, we employ the state-of-the-art large-
scale image search model in the computer vision field. In
this section, we briefly review the image search model to
enhance the understanding of our system.
A. Image Feature Descriptor
In the field of computer vision, many approaches have
been proposed to search similar images. Feature descriptor
is widely adopted for image similarity measurement. Given
an image I, interest points are detected and for each
interest point one feature vector xi is extracted to describe
the visual characteristics around this point. The feature de-
scriptor of an image consists of all feature vectors extracted
from it, denoted as X := {x1, . . . ,xα}. To achieve robust
and fast image description, different types of descriptors
are propsed, e.g., SIFT [8] and SURF [25]. For a specific
type of descriptor, feature vectors are usually of the same
dimension, e.g., the feature vector of SIFT descriptor is
128-dimension.
B. Voting-based Search Model
Many modern content-based image retrieval systems
manage millions of images, i.e., billions of high-dimension
feature vectors. Facing the big image database, the state-
of-the-art solutions (e.g., [26], [9] and [27]) usually search
similar images as follows: fist searching similar vectors for
feature vectors of the querying image in an index structure,
and then obtains matched images using a voting-based
model.
Given a query descriptor X := {x1, . . . ,xα} (descrip-
tor of the query image Ix), and a set of of descriptors
{Y1, · · · ,YN} of images in the DB, where Yn is the de-
scriptor of the n-th image, the voting-based search model
works as follows:
1) Let the score of each image in DB be Sn, and initialize
all scores to 0.
2) For each feature vector xi of X and each feature
vector ynj in DB, the score S
n is increased by Sn :=
Sn+ δ(xi,y
n
j ), where δ(xi,y
n
j ) is a matching function
measuring the similarity between feature vectors xi
and ynj based on k-nearest neighbors (k-NNs). For-
mally, the matching function is defined as
δ(xi,y
n
j ) =
{
1 if ynj is a k-NN of xi
0 otherwise
(1)
For the k-NNs search, the dissimilarity of feature
vectors are typically measured by Euclidean distance.
3) By ranking the image scores, images with largest
scores are selected as the matched images.
Facing hundreds of feature vectors of a query image and
billions of feature vectors in DB, accurate k-NNs search is
too expensive for most image search applications. Approx-
imate search greatly improves the performance but suffers
from a little loss of search accuracy. The most common
way is indexing the massive feature vectors by partitioning
them into groups via high-dimension clustering. Given a
query feature vector, the system firstly finds the closest
cluster representative and fetches the contents within this
cluster into the memory; secondly, distances between the
query vector and fetched vectors are computed to get the
k-NNs. As a result, many clusters can be pruned quickly
to accelerate the searching process.
C. MapReduce Framework
The large-scale high-dimension vector based image
search can be very costly for both memory and CPU
even with an index structure. MapReduce [28] is a soft-
ware framework for the applications which process vast
amounts of data (multi-terabyte datasets) on large clusters
(thousands of nodes) of commodity hardware in a parallel,
reliable and fault-tolerant manner. Exploiting the power of
parallel computing of MapReduce, the image query can be
handled within an acceptable response time [27].
III. Multi-level Homomorphic Encryption
To empower the cloud to maintain the image index
as well as search images in a privacy-preserving way, we
employ an efficient multi-level homomorphic encryption
(HE) protocol presented by Xiao et al. [24]. The protocol
is defined as follows:
Definition 1: The multi-level homomorphic encryption
is defined by three algorithms (K, HE.E, HE.D), where
K, HE.E and HE.D are the key generation, encryption and
decryption algorithms, and it satisfies HE.D(HE.E(m, k)) =
m given k ← K(1λ).
We carefully review the design and security proof of
this protocol, and make sure it is correct. Considering
it is not the contribution of this work, we omitted the
detail explanation due to space limitation. Notably, the
homomorphic encryption has the following good properties
we want to utilize in our work:
Additive and Multiplicative Homomorphism: Their
encryption has the following homomorphism:
HE.E(m1, k) · HE.E(m2, k) = HE.E(m1m2, k)
HE.E(m1, k) + HE.E(m2, k) = HE.E(m1 +m2, k)
This also implies the homomorphism over any polynomial
function f , i.e.,
f (HE.E(m1, k), HE.E(m2, k), · · · , HE.E(ml, k))
= HE.E (f(m1,m2, · · · ,ml), k)
Key Conversion: If we have k =
∏
i ki for the key k, the
encryption has the following property:(∏
i
k−1i
)
·E(m, 1)·
(∏
i
ki
)
= E(m,
∏
i
ki) = HE.E(m, k)
This implies that one does not need to decrypt and re-
encrypt the message to alter the key of a ciphertext, which
is very useful in our system design. Note that a randomizer
is omitted for the sake of simplicity, so it is not possible
to attack this encryption via brute-force search if the
ciphertext size is large enough.
A. Distance Calculation via HE
Based on HE, we can conduct the distance calculation
for two feature vectors x,y on the ciphertexts as follows,
where x(j) refers to the j-th dimension of the feature
vector x, and D(x,y) = d2(x,y).
HE.E (D (x,y) , k) =
∑
k
(HE.E (x(j), k) − HE.E (y(j), k))2
Then, the distance calculation can be outsourced to
anyone who does not know the key by giving him all
the ciphertexts. Since the calculation is conducted on the
ciphertexts, the outsourcing does not reveal information
about feature vectors or the calculation output. Hereafter,
we use the notation φD (·) to denote the function which
conducts distance calculation given homomorphic cipher-
texts of two vectors. That is:
φD (HE.E (x, k) , HE.E (y, k)) = HE.E (D(x,y), k) .
B. Fixed Point Representation
The numeric type of feature vectors may be real num-
ber, but the homomorphic encryption used in this paper is
based on large integers, therefore we need to use integers to
represent real numbers first. In PIC, we use the fixed point
representation ( [29]) to represent real numbers due to its
simplicity when applying elementary arithmetic operations
to it.
Given a real number a and a fixed precision p, anm+1-
dimension binary arrayA satisfies the following in the fixed
point representation with Two’s Complement:
{
A[0] = 0 ∧
∑
m
k=1
A[k] · 2−k+p ≈ a a ≥ 0
A[0] = 1 ∧ −
∑
m−1
k=1
(A [k]⊕ 1) · 2−k+p − A[m] · 2−k+m ≈ a a < 0
The minimum unit of this representation is 2p−m
(i.e., precision), and the range of this representation is
(−2p−1, 2p−1). Then, we use the following integer to rep-
resent the real number a (with some errors less than the
minimum unit):
f(a) =
{∑m
k=1 A[k] · 2m−k if A[0] = 0
−∑mk=1 (A [k]⊕ 1) 2m−k if A[0] = 1
which is the definition of signed integer with Two’s com-
plement.
TABLE I. Fixed Point Representation Operations
+,− f(a± b) = f(a)± f(b)
× f(a · b) = f(a) · f(b)/2m−1−p
Note that the addition/subtraction (x ± y), multipli-
cation (x · y) and the division (xy ) are all elementary
arithmetic operations closed in integer domain (i.e., a/b
is the quotient of ab ). We assume m, p are pre-defined
parameters based on the range and precision requirements
of the application. For simplicity, we will omit the real-
integer conversion and use normal arithmetic operations on
real numbers in the following presentation, but the values
must be converted to the fixed point representation and
fixed point representation operation (Table I) should be
applied in applications.
IV. System Overview
We present the overview of our system design, threat
model and the security assumption before further present-
ing design details.
A. Architecture & Entities
Fig. 2 describes the flow of our system. The system
is designed to let users store, share and search images via
external cloud servers without conducting computationally
heavy tasks. The entire outsourced computation is con-
ducted on the ciphertexts directly, therefore users’ image
content privacy is preserved against cloud servers or other
adversaries. Specifically, for the image owner our system
protects his images, images’ feature descriptors and search
results (similarities) from unauthorized parties (including
KA and CS); for the image querier, our system also pro-
tects the querying content from unauthorized parties. More
precisely, we have the following entities in our system:
• Users: a user can be an image owner and an image
querier simultaneously. An owner stores and shares his
images with others by outsourcing them to the cloud
servers, and a querier searches an image on the DB
located at the cloud server side.
• Cloud Server (CS): The cloud server is in charge of
majority of the computation and the storage through-
out the system. Whenever a transaction request ar-
rives, he processes the request by computing on the
ciphertexts. CS could be any commercial cloud service
providers who are willing to improve their services to
attract more privacy-sensitive users.
• Key Agent (KA): The key agent manages vari-
ous secret keys such that no one within the system
(including himself) learn the final key used in the
encryption. Majority of the transaction between users
and CS is relayed by KA. KA could be any agent who
is unlikely to collude with the CS or a specific user.
For example, for crowd-sourced criminal investigation,
KA can be a government-controlled agent; for medical
image analysis, KA can be an authoritative medical
organization; for personal image management, KA can
be a reputable information security service provider.
B. Threat Model
The trusted party (TP) is introduced only to generate
the keys, who could be an auditor or a notary public
and is assumed to be fully trusted. However, the CS and
the KA who conduct most of the computation may be
motivated to infer useful information from the outsourced
computation, and they are assumed to be semi-honest,
i.e., they will follow the protocol specification in general,
but will also try their best to harvest the content of the
encrypted communication. In general, TP,CS and KA are
well protected, so we do not consider compromise attack
in this work. Also, although CS and KA are assumed to be
semi-honest, the probability that both of them collude with
a specific user is extremely small. Therefore, we assume
that it is not possible to have a user who colludes with
both CS and KA.
C. Security Assumption
Because we employ the homomorphic encryption in
Xiao et al. [24] whose security rely on the assumption that
prime factorization is hard, we also assume the following
prime factorization is hard:
Definition 2: (Prime Factorization) A prime factoriza-
tion problem is to solve all pi’s given a product of prime
numbers n =
∏
i pi.
V. Basic System Design
With the background and the system model, we are
ready to present the detailed design of our system PIC.
Our system supports the following four operations to
serve the users: initialization, key generation & policy
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Fig. 2. PIC Architecture
announcement, image upload and privacy preserving image
search with access control.
A. Initialization
Firstly, a TP picks the system parameter for the ho-
momorphic encryption ( [24]) and publishes it. Then, TP
generates a master key k to be used in the homomorphic
encryption, and he finds two random keys kCS , kKA such
that kCSkKA = k and sends kCS and kKA to CS and KA
respectively via secure channel.
B. Key Generation & Policy Announcement
Whenever a new user u joins the system, TP generates
three random keys ku, k
′
u, k
′′
u such that k = kuk
′
uk
′′
u. Then,
he gives k′u to KA, k
′′
u to CS and ku to the user u via secure
channel.
Then, the user defines the access policy which controls
who can/cannot search on his images. The policy is de-
scribed by an access tree as in CP-ABE [30], and it is
uploaded to CS for further access control.
Submitting raw attributes to CS will reveal the user’s
identity information ( [31]). Therefore, the attributes as
well as access policy should be masked before uploading.
Note that the access control policy is used as a black-
box building block in our system, and here we present
a simple policy which works with CP-ABE as a baseline
method. When joining the system, every user describes
his access policy with an access tree, but the attributes
at the leaf nodes are replaced with the hashed values of
the attributes. Whenever a querier wishes to search on
a group of specified users or the entire DB, the querier
submits his hashed attributes to CS. CS then matches
these hashed attributes with the access policies in the DB
to find out the group of users that the querier is valid
to search on. We evaluate the practicality of the access
policy by investigating a real social networking system
(in SectionVIII-D), and our analysis shows that for most
cases the simple access policy is sufficient and practical.
For some special cases, there can be other better options
for the access control (e.g., anonymous IBE with predicate
encryption [32]) which achieves better anonymity, but this
is not our main contribution, and we leave it as one of our
future work to study.
C. Image Upload
Whenever a new user u uploads some images, he first
extracts the feature descriptors from them, and encrypts
the descriptors using his key ku as follows:
HE.E ({Xi,1,Xi,2, · · · } , ku)
Then, the user needs to either create or update the in-
dex cluster for his feature descriptors by two phases. (1)
Indices construction: cluster representatives are selected
from feature vectors as centroids of clusters. (2) Clustering:
other vectors are assigned to clusters. Various clustering
techniques can be applied, and different clustering tech-
niques have different performance and accuracy. One can
simply use k-mean clustering to create the index of vectors.
At each time the user wants to update the index, he will
either re-construct the it or just incrementally append new
representatives or nodes into the current clusters.
After the clusters are prepared, he appends references
to the nodes in the cluster which points to the correspond-
ing ciphertexts of feature vectors. Then, the raw index
clusters are sent to CS. To reduce the communication over-
head, the user can send only the change of the index cluster
instead. Once he completes the update (or creation), the
ciphertexts are sent to KA.
KA, upon receiving the ciphertexts, conducts the fol-
lowing operation for every ciphertext to get the ciphertexts
with altered key kuk
′
u:
k′−1u HE.E ({Xi,1, · · · } , ku) k′u = HE.E ({Xi,1, · · · } , kuk′u)
Then, KA sends the altered ciphertexts to CS.
CS conducts the following operation to get the final
ciphertexts:
k′′−1u HE.E ({Xi,1, · · · } , kuk′u) k′′u =HE.E ({Xi,1, · · · } , kuk′uk′′u)
=HE.E ({Xi,1, · · · } , k)
Then, CS merges the user u’s index cluster with the global
one for his DB, but leaving a label to mark the owner of
the cluster.
D. Privacy-preserving Search with Access Control
One image search has two phases: level-1 search and
level-2 search. In the level-1 search, KA first finds out
the cluster representative in the index cluster which is
closest to the querying feature vector. Then, in the level-2
search, he finds out the k-nearest neighbors (k-NNs) of the
querying feature vector within the cluster.
Level-1 Search
When a querier q wants to search an image, he first ex-
tracts the feature descriptor (i.e., a set of feature vectors)
from the querying image. Then, he encrypts the feature
descriptor Xq of the querying image with his key kq as
HE.E (Xq, kq), and submits the ciphertexts to KA. Then,
KA alters the ciphertext to HE.E
(
Xq, kqk
′
q
)
and sends
them to CS. CS finally alters the ciphertexts to
HE.E
(
Xq, kqk
′
qk
′′
q k
−1
CS
)
= HE.E
(
Xq, kk
−1
CS
)
= HE.E (Xq, kKA)
Besides, the querier also uploads his hashed attributes
to CS. CS then searches all users’ access policies and finds
out the users that the querier is valid to search on their
images. Then, CS computes the following altered cipher-
texts, where {yo} refers to the set of representative feature
vectors (cluster leaders) in previously found owners’ index
clusters, and all {yo} are stored in the form of ciphertexts
encrypted by k:
kCSHE.E ({yo} , k) k−1CS =HE.E
({yo} , kk−1CS)
=HE.E ({yo} , kKA)
After all the altered ciphertexts are ready, CS computes
the φD(·) function (Section III-A) for every pair of
(HE.E (x, kKA) , HE.E (y, kKA)), where x ∈ Xq is a feature
vector belonging to the descriptor of the querying image,
and y ∈ {yo}. Then, CS achieves the pairwise encrypted
distances, which are sent to KA.
KA is able to decrypt the distances since the cipher-
texts are encrypted under his key kKA. After decrypting
the distances, he finds out the nearest neighbor for every
x ∈ Xq.
Level-2 Search
After finding the nearest neighbor among the repre-
sentatives for every x ∈ Xq, KA further requests the
distances between the x and all the vectors within the
nearest neighbor’s cluster.
Upon receiving the request, CS generates the following
altered ciphertexts using the key conversion (Section III)
and φD(·) function as aforementioned, where {yc} is the
set of vectors within the nearest neighbor’s cluster:{
{HE.E (D (x,y) , kKA)}∀y∈{yc}
}
∀x∈Xq
Then, he sends these ciphertexts of distances as well as
the image IDs associated with the feature vectors in the
ciphertexs to KA. KA decrypts the ciphertexts and deter-
mines the k-NNs among {HE.E (D (x,y) , kKA)}∀y∈{yc} for
each x ∈ Xq. Based on the distances and the corresponding
image IDs, he calculates the score Sn of all images (Section
II) appearing in the image IDs sent from CS and returns
the image ID with the highest score to the querier. The
querier then retrieves the encrypted image from the DB.
One can further apply oblivious transfer (will be described
in Section IX) to prevent the CS from inferring the query
result by monitoring its memory access.
In this level-2 search, if CS does not find k ciphertexts
within one cluster, he also chooses the next nearest neigh-
bor among the representatives and sends the corresponding
ciphertexts to KA as well. This is repeated until he finds
out at least k ciphertexts to return to KA.
VI. System Refinements
The basic system we proposed in the previous section
works fine in some cases, e.g. people recognition in a
face image collection, but its performance is degraded in
more general cases as we will discuss below. Therefore, we
present several improvements for our scheme to boost the
performance, and finally formally describe the advanced
scheme with these optimizations in this section.
A. Dealing with Complicated Images
A feature descriptor usually contains a set of high-
dimension feature vectors, e.g. 128 dimensions for SIFT.
Since each dimension is a 64-bit real value, when we
consider the encryption, each feature vector’s size becomes
64KB because each dimension is encrypted with a 4 × 4
matrix with 256-bit integers. Then, the number of feature
vectors in an image determines the size of its feature
descriptor. For the face recognition, 9 feature vectors are
enough to conduct an accurate search because face models
are well developed. However, for complicated image with
hundreds of feature vectors, the size of ciphertexts is not
acceptable for many mobile devices. Therefore, we further
optimize our system using more compact image descriptor
to reduce the communication overhead.
We adopt frequency vector of visual words as image
descriptor( [5], [33]). It quantizes the space of feature
vectors to obtain a visual dictionary of size n. An image
can be represented with the frequency histogram of visual
words, by choosing the nearest word for each of its feature
vectors. Then the feature descriptor is significantly reduced
to one n-dimension frequency vector. The similarity be-
tween images can be computed by the scalar product of
two frequency vectors.
To minimize the accuracy loss caused by quantizing
the feature vector space to a discrete one, we weight the
frequency vector with term frequency inverse document
frequency (tf-idf, [33]). Based on tf-idf, given a dictionary
of n words and an image dataset of N images, the weighted
frequency vector of an image I is fI = (w1, w2, · · · , wm),
and each weight wi is: wi =
fi,I
nI
log Nfi , where fi,I is the
frequency of the lexicographic (in the visual dictionary) i-
th feature vector in the image I, nI is the total number of
feature vectors in I, fi is the frequency of the i-th feature
vector among N images. The experimental results in peer
work( [33]) and our evaluation result (Section VIII-F) show
that using this weighted visual word instead of exact fea-
ture vectors brings a negligible accuracy loss. Therefore, we
use this weighted frequency vector with visual dictionary
as our feature descriptor in our advanced scheme.
B. Leveraging the Parallel Computation
We further expedite the search process by applying the
MapReduce framework. To do so, the search must support
parallelism. Looking at the level-1 search and the level-
2 search, one can easily find both searches (finding the
NN among the representatives and the k-NNs within the
cluster) can be done by arbitrary number of mappers and
one reducer. The ciphertexts of the feature vectors in DB
and the querying vectors will be given to the mappers
at CS, who conducts the homomorphic operations and
the key modification to generate the ciphertexts of the
distances. Then, they are sent to the reducer at KA who
decrypts and sorts the distances.
However, there is a problem if our approach is directly
implemented with a MapReduce framework. Unless the
data is stored with a special format (e.g., bucketized),
sorting limits the number of reducers to one because the
mappers do not emit the (key,value)=(image ID, distance)
pairs in a sorted order. However, since the sorting order
depends on the querying feature vector, the number of
reducers will be always 1. This is a great bottleneck since
the reducer needs to wait for all (key,value) pairs emitted
from all mappers before it continues to sort. To solve this
bottleneck, we can return all the neighbors within a certain
threshold distance instead of the exact NN in the level-1
search or the k-NNs in the level-2 search. By doing so,
we can theoretically have arbitrary number of reducers to
finish the search task in a parallel manner. If the threshold
is chosen such that not enough results are found, one can
easily use a binary search manner to adjust the threshold
until enough results are found for further processing.
C. Choosing a Good Clustering Method
In fact, the clustering in the image upload operation
heavily affects the performance and the accuracy, espe-
cially when it works with the MapReduce framework.
Extended cluster pruning approach with recursion [10], [34]
provides a promising way for efficient clusters construction
and queries processing, and can be fitted appropriately in
the MapReduce framework. Here we briefly review this
approach and apply it in the advanced scheme.
Given a set V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vN} of N vectors in
d-dimension space and a positive integer L. The cluster
pruning based approach searches k-nearest neighbors for
a query vector q via two phases: preprocessing and query
processing. During the preprocessing, C vectors are chosen
as representatives at random and denoted by r1, . . . , rC .
C is determined by C = N/S, where S is the target
size of each cluster. The C representatives are organized
in a multi-level hierarchy of L levels. Each other vector
in V traverses the tree and is attached to its closest
representatives at the bottom of the tree. The vectors are
partitioned into C clusters C1, . . . ,CC with a logarithmic
complexity. The clusters will be stored on a hard disk while
the tree of representatives is small enough to be fitted in a
memory, which can be processed efficiently by a mapper.
Hereafter, we denote the representative of each cluster as
li, which is also called as the leader of this cluster.
During the query processing, by navigating down the
tree of cluster leaders, the nearest leader of a query vector
q is searched. Then the corresponding bottom cluster is
fetched and the k-NNs for q are sought inside this cluster.
Obviously, the k-NNs for q within the cluster is not always
the global k-NNs of q among all feature vectors. Then, to
improve the search accuracy, one may leverage the state-of-
the-art soft-assignment and multi-probe techniques. The
soft-assignment allows each vector to be assigned to its
α nearest representatives. The multi-probe allows each
search to probe β closest clusters simultaneously to search
the overall k-NNs among these clusters.
D. Advanced Scheme
Only the image upload and the privacy-preserving
image search with access control will be changed in the
advanced scheme. The changed operations are as follows:
1) Image Upload: The user u firstly extracts the feature
vectors from every image that he wants to upload to CS.
Then, he uses k-mean clustering to find the k clusters
among all his vectors, and sets all the centroids as elements
in the visual dictionary of size k. Hereafter, we use Du to
denote user u’s dictionary. After Du is generated, user u
also calculates the k-dimension weighted frequency vector
of each image I as fI , and uses CP-ABE to encrypt all
parameters in the weight function ({fi,I , fi}i, N) as well
as Du:
ABE.E (Du, {fi,I , fi}i = 1, · · · , k,N) .
User u sends this ciphertext to CS, and encrypts all
weighted frequency vectors as: HE.E ({fI}I , ki). Then, he
uses aforementioned extended cluster pruning approach
with recursion to construct an index tree of all fI ’s, where
each node contains the reference to the corresponding
encrypted vector. The raw index tree is sent to CS (if only
updated, only the changed parts are sent to CS), and the
encrypted ciphertexts are sent to KA.
KA, upon receiving the ciphertexts, conducts the key
modification to alter the ciphertexts to:
HE.E ({fI}I , kuk′u) .
Then, KA sends the new ciphertexts to CS, who conducts
another key modification to achieve the final ciphertexts:
HE.E ({fI}I , kuk′uk′′u) = HE.E ({fI}I , k) .
2) Privacy-preserving Search with Access Control:
Same as the basic scheme, we also have two phases in a
search.
Level-1 Search
When a querier q wants to search an image, he first ex-
tracts the feature vectors from the querying image. Then,
he retrieves the ABE.E (Do, {fi,I , fi}i = 1, · · · , k,N)’s of
all image owner o’s that he wants to search on, and
decrypts the dictionaries as well as the parameters with
his attributes. Then, he looks up each dictionary to cre-
ate a frequency vector of his querying image for each
Do. Then, he calculates m weighted frequency vectors
with the decrypted parameters, which are encrypted as:
HE.E ({f}all owners, kq). This is relayed by KA (after alter-
ing the key to kqk
′
q) and finally arrives CS who finally
alters the key to kqk
′
qk
′′
q = k. Then, CS finds out the index
trees of the users that querier q wishes to search on, and
conducts the following key modification, where {yo} refers
to the set of frequency vectors referenced (via ciphertext)
by the cluster leaders in those index trees:
HE.E
({yo} , kk−1CS) = HE.E ({yo} , kKA) .
Then, CS computes the φD(·) function for every pair of
(HE.E (x, kKA) , HE.E (y, kKA)) where x is the frequency
vector of the querying image, and y ∈ {yo}. The outputs
of the function are the pairwise encrypted distances, which
are sent to KA.
KA proceeds with MapReduce framework. He sends
the ciphertexts to his mappers, each mapper decrypts the
distances and emits the (key,value)=(image ID,distance)
to his reducers, and the reducers find out the distances
above a threshold θ, which corresponds to the distances of
x’s nearest neighbors.
Level-2 Search
After finding the NNs, KA further requests the dis-
tances between x and all vectors under those NNs in the
index trees.
Upon receiving the request, CS generates the encrypted
distances using the key modification as well as the φD(·)
function. They are transmitted to KA who sends those ci-
phertexts to his mappers to let them decrypt the distances.
The (image ID,distance) pairs are sent to his reducers, and
they finally find out the images whose distances are above
another threshold θ′.
VII. Security Analysis
The security of a system is given by the security of its
weakest link. Since the participating adversaries are more
powerful than non-participating adversaries and colluding
adversaries are more powerful than a single adversary,
we analyze the security of our system in the worst case
scenario: colluding participating adversaries, including CS,
KA and users (TP is fully trusted). Note that CS and KA
do not collude with each other, and a user can collude with
at most one party of CS and KA. Therefore, we have the
following two cases: colluding user and CS; colluding user
and KA.
It is already formally proved in [24] that the homomor-
phic encryption is secure against colluding user & CS or
colluding user & KA, hence no party in the system can
infer the plaintext from the ciphertext without knowing
the key. We further analyze the extra information leakage
in our system.
Colluding user and KA
Colluding user and KA only learn ku, k
′
u during the key
generation, index construction or the index update. During
the image search, KA receives a number of encrypted dis-
tances HE.E (D(x,y), kKA) which are encrypted with kKA.
Then, KA can decrypt the distances, and the colluding
user (a querier in this case) will know all the distances
between the encrypted feature vectors in the database and
his querying feature vectors. However, no ciphertexts of
vectors are sent to KA or user. Therefore, the user only
learns a number of distances, which is not useful to infer
the images in CS’s database. All the user gets is only
the query result, which is the ciphertext of the matched
image. Therefore, colluding user and CS do not gain useful
information except the valid search result.
Colluding user and CS.
Colluding user and CS only learn ku, k
′′
u during the key
generation. During the index forest construction and the
index update, CS may share the ciphertext
HE.E ({Xi,1,Xi,2, · · · }, kuk′u) received from KA with user,
from which the user can use the key modification to achieve
the ciphertext HE.E ({Xi,1,Xi,2, · · · }, k′u). However, since
k′u is unknown to both parties, it is not possible to
infer Xi,1,Xi,2, · · · from the ciphertexts. During the image
search, CS may also share the ciphertexts of the distance
with the user, but neither CS nor the user is able to infer
the distance from the ciphertext since none of them know
the key kKA.
VIII. Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we first present the implementation
of PIC and the datasets used in the experiments, then
we evaluate the performance of our basic scheme using
SIFT feature vectors and advanced scheme using weighted
frequency vector comprehensively. For simplicity, in the
following statement, we denote the basic scheme as PIC-
sfv and the advanced scheme as PIC-wfv.
A. System Implementation
Our implementation of PIC includes both both cloud
side and client side. On the cloud side, each of KA and
CS consists of a cluster of computers with distributed
file system (Hadoop HDFS) and MapReduce architecture
(Hadoop MapReduce). In the experiments, we use four
PCs with Intel Core i3-3240 CPU (3.4GHz) and 4G RAM
for each cluster. Each cluster has one name node and three
data nodes, which is a small but full-featured data center
to demonstrate our design, and the performance can be
greatly improved when using a large data center [35], [36].
On the client side, we implement our system for both Win-
dows OS laptops and Android phones. In the experiments,
we use a laptop (ThinkPad X1) with Intel Core i7-2620M
CPU (2.7GHz) and 4GB RAM, and a mobile phone (HTC
G17) with 1228Hz CPU, 1GB RAM. There is also a trusted
party (TP) in charge of key generation. TP is a single PC
with the same hardware as the node of the cluster.
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Fig. 3. CDF of feature vector number of images from two datasets.
We implement attribute based access control with
the PBC (Pairing-Based Cryptography) library [37]. We
develop all other cryptographic components are imple-
mented by Java, including the fix point arithmetic and
the multi-level homomorphic encryption [24]. We use three
commonly used descriptors to evaluate the practicality of
our system, including 128-dimension SIFT descriptor [8],
64-SURF and 128-SURF [25]. Nevertheless, our schemes
are also compatible with other image descriptors. The
descriptor extraction is implemented using the OpenCV
library for Window and Android. Due to the space lim-
itation, in this paper, we only present the results of the
most popular descriptor, 128-SIFT, and 64-SURF and 128-
SURF achieve similar performance as that using 128-SIFT.
B. Image Collections and Queries
To explore the performance of our approach in real-
life image applications, we evaluate our system with two
popular image datasets.
• INRIA Holiday dataset (Holiday) [26] contains
1491 personal holidays photos in high resolution (most
are 2560*1920). There are 6767563 SIFT feature vec-
tors of dimensionality 128 extracted from those im-
ages. The dataset contains 500 image groups, each of
which represents a distinct scene or object. For the
search experiments, the query is a photo of a scene,
and the goal is to return other k photos of this scene.
• Flickr image dataset (Flickr1M) [38] contains one
million diverse images from Flickr with 1.4 billion pre-
computed SIFT feature vectors in total. For the search
experiments, the query is randomly selected images,
and k most similar images are returned.
We analyze the feature vector number of each image in
two datasets. As shown in Fig. 3, The mean feature vector
number is 2,200 and 2,988 for Holiday and Flickr1M re-
spectively. Half images have less than 2000 feature vectors
and 80% images have less than 5000 feature vectors.
We evaluate PIC-sfv using SIFT feature vectors from
both datasets. For the evaluation of PIC-wfv, 1000 visual
words are learned from 6K randomly selected images
of Flickr1M as the vocabulary. And a 1000-dimension
weighted frequency vector is generated for each image by
clients.
C. Parameter Selection
Before we present our evaluation results, we first discuss
the selection of our experiment parameters.
1) Search Parameters Selection: There are three pa-
rameters governing the computation, communication and
search performance for both schemes, including: (1) The
number C of created clusters, which determines the delay,
overhead and accuracy of a search. Larger C results in
a longer clustering procedure and lower search accuracy,
but a smaller search delay. There are some analysis on
the parameter selection for optimal search quality [10],
[34], and we follow them to set C =
√
N , resulting in
2
√
N homomorphic distance calculations, where N equals
number of feature vectors for PIC-sfv and number of
weighted frequency vectors for PIC-wfv. (2) The number k
of nearest neighbors, which influences the search accuracy.
Voting-based methods are not very sensitive to k for large
collections [5], and we set k = 5 in our evaluation, which
produces good search results (Section VIII-F). (3) The
work nodes number Nnode in the parallel computation.
Existing work such as [35] and [36] have studied the
performance gain as the number of work nodes increases.
Based on those work, it is easy to estimate the performance
of our system with more computing nodes.
For PIC-wfv, another key parameter is the size of
the visual vocabulary v. Larger v yields more accurate
search result. It also determines the dimension of the
weighted frequency vector for each image. As a result,
the computation and communication cost increase linearly
with v. Based on the ground truth of Holiday, we set
v = 1000 to optimize the search accuracy (93.4%) with
acceptable overhead.
2) Security Parameters Selection: For the multi-level
homomorphic encryption, there are two parameters λ
and m governing the security level and overhead of the
system. The system can withstand an attack with up to
m ln ploy(λ) chosen plaintexts, while the communication
cost increases linearly with mλ and computation cost
increases exponentially with mλ. As a result, there is
a tradeoff between security and efficiency. In our ex-
periments, we choose m=2 and λ = 128, which allows
m ln λ10 ∼ 97 plaintext attacks with good computation
and communication cost. This might be dangerous for local
applications, because normally adversaries are allowed to
access decryption oracle for polynomial times, but our
system will remain safe since the cloud server will not allow
such ’decryption oracle access’ for several times.
D. Micro-Analysis for Each Operation
We analyze the additional computation and commu-
nication overhead introduced by our system except the
image process related overhead in this subsection. Due to
the space limitation, we omit the evaluation results on
the Android phone, whose runtime is the same order of
magnitude as that on the laptop.
(1) Computation Overhead
The runtime of each operation is summarized in Ta-
ble II and then the detailed analysis is presented as follows.
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TABLE II. Computation cost for each operation using a
single PC. (s) λ = 128, m = 2,the SIFT-vec is 128-dimension
SIFT feature vector, the Freq-Vec is 1000-dimension
weighted frequency feature vector.
Common Operations
Mean Min Max
Feature Extract 8.7 1.56 12.03
Parameter Init 0.002 0.002 0.003
Master Key Gen <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
KA&CS Keys Gen 0.001 0.001 0.001
Triple Keys Gen 0.002 0.002 0.003
Access Tree Gen <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Decrypt Distance <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Operations of PIC-sfv
Encrypt One SIFT-Vec 0.034 0.03 0.047
Key Modification (per SIFT-Vec) 0.052 0.048 0.063
Homomorphic Euclidean Distance 0.031 0.029 0.033
Operation of PIC-wfv
Mean Min Max
Freq-Vec Gen 0.70 0.005 3.84
Encrypt One Freq-Vec 1.93 1.59 2.67
Key Modification (per Freq-Vec) 0.29 0.25 0.85
Homomorphic Dot Product 0.20 0.18 0.33
Initialization: In this step, it requires a selection of
system parameters for the homomorphic encryption and
a selection of three random homomorphic encryption keys
k, kCS , kKA, which are 4 × 4 matrices, such that k =
kCSkKA. Both operations are executed at the TP side and
our results show that the system initiation takes less than
5ms in total, which is negligible.
Key Generation & Policy Announcement: In this
step, it requires TP to select three random keys ki, k
′
i, k
′′
i
such that k = kik
′
ik
′′
i , which costs less than 3ms. Besides,
it also involves an owner’s access tree generation. We eval-
uate the performance of our access control methods based
on the profile data of Tencent Weibo [39], which is one
of the largest social networking platform in China. This
dataset has 2.32 million users’ personal profiles, including
their year of birth, gender, graduate school, profession and
other tags. There are 770166 different attributes in total.
Each user has 6 attributes in average and 20 attributes at
most, as shown in Fig. 4. Fig. 5 illustrates the proportion of
users sharing different number of common attributes. 60%
users have no common attribute with others, about 20%
users share one common attribute with others, and 98%
users share less than four common attributes with others.
Our analysis suggests that a small access tree with limited
attributes (e.g. 6 attributes), is enough to narrow down
the size of authorized users (only 0.2% is valid), and its
generation time is only 8× 10−3ms. Given the access tree,
the runtime to authenticate the attributes of a querier is
less than 1ms. So the cost for access control is negligible.
Image Upload: For PIC-sfv, the cluster construction is
first executed by each owner, and the runtime increases
linearly with the feature vector number (Fig. 6). For two
image sets, it takes about 20 seconds to cluster feature
vectors of 100 randomly selected images. Then the owner
encrypts every descriptor using his key ki. As shown in
Table II, it takes 34ms to encrypt each 128-dimension
feature vector. The runtime to encrypt the descriptor of
each image depends on the its feature vector number as
depicted in Fig. 6. Fig. 7 shows the runtime distribution
to encrypt one image from two images sets, which is 75s
in average. After the ciphertexts are sent to KA, KA
conducts a key modification to alter the encryption key of
the ciphertexts. As shown in Fig. 7, it takes 155s to modify
the key of an image in average. The key modification at CS
side is the same operation as KA’s one and thus omitted.
For PIC-wfv, based on the visual word vocabulary, the
owner generates weight frequency vector for each image,
whose runtime is proportional to the feature vector number
of this image (Fig. 8). For two image sets, it takes 0.7s per
image in average. Then the owner encrypts the weighted
frequency vector of each image, whose runtime is depicted
in Fig 9. It takes less than 1.5s to encrypt one image.
Fig. 9 also presents the time cost of key modification
for each image by KA (or CS), which is about 0.29s.
The evaluation shows that the advance scheme based
on the weight frequency vector significantly improve the
computation efficiency.
Privacy-preserving Image Search with Access Con-
trol: The querier first encrypts the image descriptor (SIFT
feature vectors or one weighted frequency vector), whose
run time is the same as the one in the image uploading
(Fig. 7 and Fig. 9). The key modifications by KA and
CS are also the same. Besides, in PIC-sfv, CS needs to
compute the ciphertexts of all squared Euclidean distances.
Using a single machine, each distance takes 31ms and the
whole time cost depends on the number of query feature
vectors and the size of the searched vector collection in DB,
i.e. (#cluster + cluster size) × #featurevector × 31ms.
In PIC-wfv, CS computes the ciphertexts of all dot prod-
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Fig. 9. CDF of runtime of upload operation for each image in
two image sets (PIC-wfv).
ucts, each takes 200ms by one machine and the whole
time cost just depends on the image collection size, i.e.
(#cluster + cluster size)× 200ms. After CS prepares all
the ciphertexts, KA decrypts them to achieve the distances
or dot products, and sort them to find out the NN. For
both schemes, each decryption requires less than 1ms and
it takes about 0.5s to decrypt 1000 distances. We use quick-
sort to sort the distances, but we omit the run time analysis
since this is a standard sorting method. For Holiday, with-
out MapReduce functions, using PIC-sfv each query (with
more than 3000 feature vectors) averagely takes about 100
machine-hours to find the matching image among the 1491
images; using PIC-wfv each query takes about 15 machine-
seconds. Deploying our MapReduce implementations on
the 4-node small data center, the delay is reduced to about
17 hours for PIC-sfv and reduced to 4s for PIC-wfv.
As a brief summary, both PIC-sfv and PIC-wfv have
same initialization delay and similar runtime for index
construction and frequency vector generation. However,
PIC-wfv uses only one 1000-dimension weighted frequency
vector to represent each image, while in PIC-sfv the de-
scriptor of each image is a set of 128-dimension SIFT fea-
ture vectors. When the size of feature vectors is small, two
scheme has comparable performance. But as the feature
vector size increases, PIC-sfv’s overhead increases linearly
while PIC-wfv keeps the runtime almost a constant. More-
over, for the privacy-preserving image search, our schemes
work excellently with MapReduce framework to reduce the
response time.
(2) Communication Overhead
TABLE III. Communication cost of each data structure.
(KB) λ = 128, m = 2,the SIFT-vec is 128-dimension SIFT
feature vector, the Freq-Vec is 1000-dimension weighted
frequency feature vector.
Common Data
Mean Min Max
Key 0.84 0.19 1.4
Access Tree 0.18 0.03 0.63
Encrypted Distance 0.56 0.41 0.65
Data of PIC-sfv
Encrypted SIFT-Vec 64 62.8 65.1
Data of PIC-wfv
Mean Min Max
Encrypted Freq-Vec 580 578.9 581.2
We first summarize the size of the transmitted data
structure in Table III. Then we analyze the communication
cost for each operation.
Initialization: TP needs to send key kCS and kKA to CS
and KA respectively, and the mean size of a single key is
0.84KB.
Key Generation & Policy Announcement: TP sends
ki, k
′
ik
′′
i to the user i, CS and KA respectively, and each
key’s size is 0.84KB. Based on the user attributes of
Tencent Weibo, the size of the access tree with 6 attributes
is about 0.2KB.
Image Upload: The user informs CS of the change in the
index cluster, but this is almost negligible. Main communi-
cation overhead comes from the ciphertexts transmission.
For PIC-sfv, uploading the encrypted feature vectors in-
curs #feature vector×64KB data transmission. For PIC-
wfv, the ciphertexts (encrypted weighted frequency vector)
size of each image is 580KB, which is constant. Similarly,
KA also needs to send out ciphertexts of the same size to
CS.
Privacy Preserving Image Search with Access Con-
trol: First, the querier encrypts the query descriptor and
sends the corresponding ciphertexts to KA, which is
#feature vector× 64KB for PIC-sfv and 580KB for PIC-
wfv. KA also sends the same amount of ciphertexts to CS.
For PIC-sfv, in the level-1 search, after CS computes the
encrypted distances for all representatives, the encrypted
distances are sent back to KA, the size is 0.56KB each
and the whole size is #cluster × 0.56KB. During the
level-2 search, CS computes the encrypted distances for
all vectors within the NN’s cluster, and sends them to
KA (cluster size × 0.56KB). For PIC-wfv, similarly, CS
computes and send all encrypted dot products to KA,
whose size is (#cluster + cluster size) × 0.56KB. For
Holiday, the transmitted data between CS and KA during
search is about 2800KB for two rounds search of PIC-sfv
and 43KB for PIC-wfv.
E. Macro-Analysis for Each Entity
We analyze the overall computation overhead for each
entity in this subsection. Similarly, we only analyze the
additional overhead except that for the image processing.
Cloud Server: The computational delay at CS side during
the image uploading comes from key modification. In PIC-
sfv, it is #feature vector × 52ms (Fig. 6) and about
200s for 80% images (Fig. 7). Using PIC-wfv, it takes
about 1.2s for 80% images. During the image search,
the computation cost of CS comes from the homomor-
phic distance calculation. For a single node, the cost is
(#cluster+ cluster size)×#feature vector×31ms using
PIC-sfv and (#cluster+ cluster size)×200ms using PIC-
wfv.
Key Agent: KA experiences the same delay as CS during
the image upload. The computation cost of KA during
search comes from decrypting all distances and ranking
them to find the NN. The run time is 0.5s to process 1000
distances.
Client: The computational delays occur during the system
join, image upload and the image search for an ordinary
user. The system join cost is negligible (about 3ms). In
PIC-sfv, the clustering cost is negligible compared to the
encryption cost, and encryption cost is #feature vector×
34ms (Fig. 6). So the computational delay of upload
is about 100s for 80% images from the two image sets
(Fig. 7). Similarly, for PIC-wfv, the computational delay
during upload for 80% images is only about 2.2s and 1.5s
in average(Fig. 9). During search, the client does nothing
but waits for the search result from the cloud and the delay
is the summation of computational delay at CS and KA.
In summary, for a querier, after providing a query
image, the response time is mainly the computational delay
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Fig. 10. Computation overhead distribution among CS, KA and
client for a single query .
accumulation of image encryption, two key modifications,
homomorphic distance calculation, distance decryption
and ranking. When the querier can access all 1491 images
of Holiday on the cloud, the average response time of each
query is about 17 hours and 8 minutes for PIC-sfv and
7.21 seconds for PIC-wfv. Here the delay can be greatly
reduced as the cloud scales up from 4 nodes to hundreds
of nodes. Besides, compared to exiting multi-part secure
computation based methods, by our approach, during the
search no interaction is required for the client and 97%
computation is carried out by CS, leaving KA and clients
very limited overhead (Fig. 10).
F. Performance Comparison
Compare with alternative methods. [24] has com-
pared its cost against the well-known homomorphic en-
cryption scheme of Gentry [40]. Gentry’s scheme needs
more than 900 seconds to add two 32 bit numbers, and
more than 67000 seconds for the multiplication, but the
cost for [24] is only 0.1 ms and 108 ms respectively.
The reason is that Gentry’s fully homomorphic encryption
is based on the ”learning with errors” (LWE) problems
in lattice system, which allows users to apply as many
multiplications as they want on the ciphertexts. [24] is
based on number theory and group theory, which only
supports a limited number of homomorphic operations,
but is sufficient for our application. So, [24] is much more
practical and compact. We also realize private Euclidean
distance computation using a partial homomorphic en-
cryption (Paillier encryption) in the SMC manner (e.g. the
method used in [32]). Using the same computer and test
images, the Paillier-based method (128-bit) takes about
0.5s for feature vector encryption and 0.18s for homomor-
phic distance computation. But in our work, they take only
0.034s and 0.031s respectively. The comparison shows the
computation efficiency of our system.
Search Accuracy. First, we evaluate the search accuracy
of our approaches according to the ground truth of 500
queries of Holiday. With k=5 (five nearest neighbors are
fetched), the accuracy of PIC-sfv is 95.2% and of PIC-
wfv is 93.4%. Here the accuracy is the success rate of
500 queries. A result is success if the returned k images
contain at least one image from the same scene as the
query image. So, our solution achieves privacy-preserving
without sacrificing the search accuracy. When a vocabulary
is learnt, PIC-wfv provides the similarly good accuracy as
PIC-sfv.
Linear Search vs. Our Approaches with MapRe-
duce.
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Fig. 11. Search time using different approaches VS. feature vector
number of the query image. Two different size searched image collec-
tions (1K and 10K) are selected randomly from Flickr1M.
We implement the SIFT feature vector based scheme
and the visual word based scheme using the Hadoop
MapReduce framework to accelerate the search. To study
the search efficiency of different schemes, we compare the
computational overhead of our two schemes using a 4-node
cluster with the one of conducting a linear search using a
single computer on the raw images data. The comparison is
presented at Fig. 11, which shows the overhead is reduced
an order of magnitude by the SIFT feature vector based
approach. Furthermore, the visual word based approach
keeps the overhead a second-level constant.
Then we evaluate the improvement caused by adapting
our privacy-preserving search to MapReduce framework.
We run the 500 queries on the encrypted Holiday data
set. With a single computer, the cluster based approach
takes about 100 hours for each query, and the visual word
based approach takes 15 seconds for each query. When
running on the 4-node small cluster with our MapReduce
adaptive implementation, the runtime reduces from 100 to
17 hours and from 15 seconds to 4s respectively. With a
large cluster, the improvement will be much bigger.
With vs. Without Privacy Protection. By running the
visual word based search on Holiday on the 4-node cluster
in two cases, where all computation in the first case is
conducted on the raw image data and all computation in
the second case is conducted on ciphertexts as our system
design. In the first case, the average response time for each
query is 1.8s and in the second case, that is 4s. The result
shows that our system provides good protection to the
image privacy with little extra overhead.
As a conclusion, leveraging the power of indexing and
MapReduce, our system design improves the search per-
formance greatly while keeping a high search accuracy and
well protected privacy.
IX. Related work
A. Image Indexing and Search
A lot of work address the problem searching for sim-
ilar images, and most of them are based on the local
invariant descriptors. Typically, high-dimension descrip-
tors are extracted from the interest regions of images to
represent their visual characteristics. Different types of
descriptors are proposed to achieve efficient and accurate
image matching, e.g., SIFT [8] and SURF [25]. The 128-
dimension SIFT is the most widely used descriptor for
image search due to its distinctiveness and computational
efficiency. An accurate approach to search similar images
is to measure the distance between images’ descriptors
and conduct nearest neighbor search. But facing billions
of high-dimension vectors, the accurate nearest neighbor
search is too expensive. Various feature vector indexing
approaches are designed to boost the search efficiency. A
common way is using clustering to prune many clusters
during the k-NN search, e.g., kd-tree [41] and cluster
pruning [34]. Among various recent research work, ex-
tended cluster pruning [10] provides a promising way for
efficient cluster construction and query processing, which
outperforms the comparable solutions like p-sphere tree
[42] and rank aggregation [43]. Besides clustering, Sivic
and Zisserman [33] introduce the bag-of-features (BOF) for
image search, which quantizes feature vectors into limited
visual words using the k-means algorithm. An image is
then represented by a visual word frequency vector. Based
on visual words, a lot of work speed up the search process
e.g., [5]. As commercial data center get more and more
popular, it is also possible to improve large-scale image
search using computer clusters. MapReduce [28] provides
an efficient programming framework for processing large
data set in parallel. There are some work using MapReduce
to accelerate the indexing and search process, e.g., [27].
However, few of the image indexing and search systems
consider the privacy protection of the image owner and
the querier.
B. Image Privacy Protection
To protect privacy information in the image, there are
some applications simply encrypting the image or blacking
out private contents, e.g., human faces. [44] removes facial
characteristics from the video frame to protect the face pri-
vacy of individuals in video surveillance. P3 [45] proposes
a privacy preserving photo sharing scheme by separating
an image into private part and public part, and encrypts
the private part directly. Many access control mechanisms
are proposed to enable data owners to determine who
can access their outsourced private data. For example, the
data encrypted by ABE [46]–[48] can only be decrypted
by the user whose attributes satisfy the access rule. [30]
presents a Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(CP-ABE) which keeps encrypted data confidential even
if the storage server is untrusted. And the CP-ABE is
improved in [49]. Those work provide privacy protection to
image storage, leaving the processed image of limited use
and no image search is supported for the private image.
GigaSight [50] proposes an Internet system for collection
of crowd-sourced video from mobile devices, which blacks
out sensitive information from video frames. For search
purpose, each frame is analyzed by computer vision code
to obtain tags as the index. However, it cannot support
image similarity based search and the indices also expose
sensitive information.
C. Privacy Preserving Search
Searching on encrypted (SoE) data was introduced by
Song et al. [15]. It allows users to store their encrypted
data on untrusted server and later search the data by
keywords in a privacy-preserving manner, i.e., both the
keywords and data will not be revealed. Reza et al. present
a thorough discussion on the framework of searchable sym-
metric encryption [51]. Chang et al. improve the security
and efficiency of SoE [52]. Golle et al. develop a method
supporting conjunctive keyword search [16]. Lu et al. [17]
propose a scheme allowing the data owner to delegate users
to conducting content-level fine-grained private search and
decryption. Cong, et.al. [18] extend the framework to
ranked keyword search. Recently, many work are dedicated
to improve the search efficiency and flexibility , e.g., [53]–
[57]. Chen et al. [58] design a system supporting large-
Scale privacy-preserving mapping of human genomic se-
quences on hybrid clouds using a well designed hash-based
mechanism. But those work mainly target text data and
focus on keywords search by examining the occurrences
of the searched terms (or words). They are not suitable
for content-based image search since they cannot measure
the distance between encrypted high-dimension feature
vectors. Moreover, they usually reveal the search results
to the cloud.
D. Secure Multi-part Computation and Homomorphic En-
cryption
Privacy-preserving similarity measurement as well as
search can be achieved using secure multi-party computa-
tion (SMC) [19]. SMC enables multiple parties to jointly
compute a function over their inputs, while at the same
time keeping these inputs private. There are some work
addressing private distance computing among two parties
using SMC methods [20]. Homomorphic encryption, e.g.,
Pallier and Elgamal, allows user to conduct the computa-
tion on the ciphertexts and obtain the ciphertext of the re-
sult, which matches the result of computation on the plain-
texts. There are some work providing privacy-preserving
image matching using classic homomorphic encryptions.
For example, [22] and [23] allow a client privately search for
a specific face image in the face image database of a server.
Those methods provide privacy protection to the query
image as well as the outcome of the matching algorithm,
but the result is not secure against the service provider. All
those privacy-preserving search mechanisms based on SMC
and homomorphic encryption require rounds of online
interactions with data owners during the search. Besides,
computation cost of those methods are very expensive and
none of them can be scaled to address large-scale image
sets.
Recently, Xiao et al. propose an efficient homomorphic
encryption protocol for multi-user system. [24] It is a
non-circuit based symmetric-key homomorphic encryption
scheme, whose security is equivalent to the large integer
factorization problem. We employ this protocol to design
our system.
X. Conclusion
We have presented a system PIC, which enables
privacy-preserving content-based search on large-scale out-
sourced images. With our design, the image owner can de-
termine who is valid to search and access his images. In the
image searching protocol, majority of the computationally
intensive image matching jobs are outsourced to the cloud
side, but the image privacy is preserved. The content of
images at cloud’s DB, the query result and even the query
itself are kept secret to anyone else but the image owner
or the querier. To further expedite the search process, we
introduced the index structure and made the entire search
process paralleled. We implemented our prototype system
using the Hadoop MapReduce framework in a cluster of 4
computers, and our experiment results show the efficiency
and applicability of our system.
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